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11 Introduction
Fixing nominal exchange rates is frequently justi…ed as a way to avoid excessive variability of
economic variables, in particular in developing countries. The idea behind an exchange rate peg
is that it will anchor in‡ation expectations, increase trade directly through lower uncertainty
and smaller adjustment costs, and indirectly through its e¤ect on the allocation of resources
and government policies (see Côte (1994)). It may also encourage investment into long-term
projects due to lower exchange rate risk/ transaction costs and therefore has a positive economic
impact (see Prasad et al. (2003)). Being prone to speculative attacks hard pegs became less
popular, especially after the Asian crisis of 1997. However, recent evidence suggests that monetary
authorities in many developing countries still see nominal exchange rate targeting as their priority,
despite that they o¢cially claim to have ‡oating regimes.1 Developing and emerging countries like
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, South Korea, Turkey, Russia adopted de jure ‡exible exchange
rate regimes, but de facto the exchange rate remained one of the most important if not the only
target of their monetary policy.2 Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2004) report that a crawling peg was the
most common type of exchange rate arrangement in the Asian emerging countries between 1990
and 2001.
Despite the post-1997 decade was relatively tranquil in developing and emerging countries3,
the exchange rate volatility under these ‘soft pegs’ varied over time. There is a number of studies
that document di¢culties in explaining these sudden changes in ‘regimes’ with higher or lower
volatilities.4 Theoretical explanations for these di¤erent regimes include non-rational behaviour,
non-linear decisions, heterogeneity of agents like the presence of ‘noise traders’ and so on (see
Jeanne and Rose (2002) for an important example).
The main aim of this paper is to present a much simpler model that can help to understand
some of these empirical facts. We claim that the way how monetary policy is conducted can be re-
sponsible for the existence of time periods with large di¤erence in the volatility of macroeconomic
variables. We employ a simple linear stochastic model that has become the workhorse model in
monetary economics and abstract from many features that may characterise many developing or
emerging countries, e.g. capital control or incomplete exchange rate pass-through. However, we
account for incomplete …nancial markets and study discretionary monetary policy. Both of these
features are fairly common in developing countries: …nancial markets are incomplete and gov-
ernments cannot precommit. The above set-up is su¢cient to generate multiple policy equilibria
that will exist even in more detailed models. Speci…cally, we show the existence of two rational
expectations equilibria that are associated with di¤erent speeds of adjustment towards the steady
state and therefore with di¤erent volatilities of all macroeconomic variables.
The key to multiplicity is time-consistency of discretionary policy and dynamic complemen-
1See e.g Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) and Calvo and Reinhart (2002).
2See Rahmatsyah et al. (2002) for Thailand, Dogolnar (2002) for Turkey, Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia and
Pakistan, and Arize et al. (2000) for 13 developing countries.
3We do not take into account the recent …nancial crisis.
4See e.g. Engel and Hamilton (1990), Clarida et al. (2003) or Chen (2006) who apply Markov-switching models
to explain these changes. These models have also been employed to describe exchange rate behaviour in ‡oating
regimes. However, their succes is still a matter of current debate see e.g. again Clarida et al. (2003) and Engel
et al. (2007).
1tarities.5 Under time consistency, the policymaker takes current and future economic conditions
into account, but can only commit to current behavior. Economic conditions are a¤ected by the
response of the rational private sector and any response is based on a forecast of future economic
conditions. As a consequence multiple equilibria may arise: Future policies respond to a state
that is at least partly determined by forecasts of that policy. Di¤erent sets of beliefs about the
future policy generate di¤erent future courses for policy to follow. Therefore, if the economy is
hidden by a shock, it can follow one of several adjustment paths. The volatility along these paths
is di¤erent. In presence of the several equilibria, coordination failure happens: the agents can
choose any of them. A sunspot decides which one will realise.
We demonstrate how the existence of strategic complementarities in our model generates mul-
tiplicity of equilibria.6 Under conventional in‡ation targeting, following an interest rate increase,
the e¤ect of consumption on the terms of trade reinforces the e¤ect of the interest rate on the
terms of trade. Thus we have a strategic complementarity between consumption and the terms
of trade in their e¤ect on marginal cost, which are crucial for the control of in‡ation. The result-
ing two equilibria can be classi…ed as ‘dry/patient’ and ‘wet/impatient’, based on the observed
strength of interest rate responses. Then we look at a policymaker who introduces an additional
positive weight in its policy objective that punishes the volatility of the nominal exchange rate
(provided that the anchor country ensures price stability). In this case the ‘wet/impatient’ equi-
librium becomes non-existent, while another equilibrium with even lower social welfare arises.
When the weight on the exchange rate target completely dominates other terms in the objec-
tive of the policymaker (‘currency peg’), the policymaker is able to stabilise the exchange rate
completely if there is a common belief in a stable nominal exchange rate. However, there is
another equilibrium: if there is a common belief that the nominal exchange rate is going to de-
preciate/appreciate in the future – non-zero exchange rate volatility is consistent with targeting
policy – it becomes optimal for a policymaker to validate these beliefs and generate the forecasted
depreciation/appreciation. This is in line with empirical work by Engel et al. (2007) who …nd that
short-run movements in exchange rates are primarily determined by changes in expectations. If
there is a coordination failure then the economy may be trapped in the worst equilibrium with
high volatility in all economic variables.
Our paper is also related to the work on ‘optimal delegation’. For discretionary policy Rogo¤
(1985) shows that it may be desirable for a society to allow for di¤erence between the objective
function of the monetary authority and the social objective in order to improve overall social
welfare.7 We demonstrate that adding the exchange rate stabilisation target to social targets
can marginally improve social welfare but only in the worst equilibrium, the additional exchange
target is damaging for the best equilibrium. We argue that in our framework the ‘soft peg’ is,
generally speaking, undesirable.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines the model. Section 3 discusses
the two policy equilibria for two regimes, in‡ation targeting and nominal exchange rate targeting.
5See King and Wolman (2004) for a non-linear model and Blake and Kirsanova (2008) for a general discussion
of multiplicity in LQ RE models under discretion.
6See Cooper and John (1988) and King and Wolman (2004) for a discussion about the relationship between
mulitiplicity and complementarity.
7A non-exhaustive list includes Rogo¤ (1985) and Svensson (1997) on in‡ation conservatism, Woodford (2003b)
on interest rate smoothing policy and Vestin (2006) on price-level targeting.
2Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
The framework is relatively standard and builds heavily on the small open economy model in-
troduced by Galí and Monacelli (2005), but we allow for a non zero current-account balance
by including incomplete …nancial markets following a framework proposed by Benigno (2001).8
There are two economies: the small open economy and the rest of the world. The economic
performance and domestic policy decisions of the small open economy do not have any impact on
the rest of the world. Both economies are populated by a continuum of in…nity-living households,
which consume two goods. One is produced domestically and the other good is imported from the
rest of the world, which we treat as a single, large ‘foreign country’. The law of one price holds,
but deviations from purchasing power parity (PPP) arise due to the existence of home bias in
consumption. Production takes place in two stages. First, there is a continuum of intermediate
goods …rms, which produce a di¤erentiated input. In the second stage …nal goods producers
combine these inputs into output and sell them to households in both countries. Monopolistic
competition and sticky prices are introduced to get a meaningful role for policy.
2.1 Households
Both economies, home (H) and foreign (F), consist of a continuum of in…nity-living households


















where Ct denotes private consumption and Nt hours of labour, while Gt is an index of public
consumption. ￿ is the subjective discount rate and E0 is the actuarial expectation at time t = 0.
Furthermore ￿ 2 [0;1] is the weight attached to public consumption and 1=' measures the Frisch-















Parameter ￿ > 0 denotes the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign produced
goods from the viewpoint of the domestic consumer. CH;t and CF;t are the Dixit-Stiglitz indexes


















8In a very similar model De Paoli (2009b) analyzes the welfare e¤ects of incomplete …nancial markets under
Ramsey (precommitment) policy.
3where j 2 [0;1] denotes the good variety and ￿ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties
of goods produced within a given country. Parameter ￿ 2 [0;1] is the weight of imported goods
in private home consumption and is inversely related to the degree of home bias in preferences.
Another interpretation for ￿ is as a natural index of openness.






































where PH;t(j) is the price of domestic good j and PF;t(j) denotes the price of variety j imported
from country F, where the latter is expressed in domestic currency. Wi
t is the nominal wage and
Ti
t denotes lump-sum taxes/transfers. ￿ denotes a country speci…c tax on nominal income and Et
is the nominal exchange rate, given as the price of one of unit foreign currency in terms of home
currency. We assume that the households share the revenues of owning …rms in equal proportion.
Following Woodford (2003a) we consider a cashless economy. Therefore the only explicit role
played by money is to serve as a unit of account.
We introduce incomplete …nancial markets by applying a framework proposed by Benigno
(2001).9 Households of country H can trade in two nominal one-period, risk-free bonds. One
bond is denominated in home currency, the other in foreign currency; but home currency denom-
inated bonds are only traded domestically. So only the foreign bond is traded internationally.
Furthermore, households belonging to country H have to pay an intermediation cost, if they want
to trade in the foreign bond.10 Let DH;t and DF;t denote the holdings in the home and foreign
bond of all households belonging to country H. Let a "￿" denote foreign country variables. The
gross nominal interest rates of the home and foreign bond are given by 1 + i and 1 + i￿, respec-
tively. As mentioned above households have to pay a price to trade in the international market.
These costs are determined by the function ￿(￿). Function ￿(￿) depends on the real holdings of the
foreign assets in the entire economy, and therefore is taken as given by the domestic households.
If a household belongs to a country which is in a "borrowing position" (DF;t+1 < 0), it will be
charged with a premium on the foreign interest rate and if the household belongs to a country
which is in a ‘lending position’ (DF;t+1 > 0), it receives a rate of return lower than the foreign
interest rate. Along with Benigno (2001) we need the following restrictions on ￿(￿): ￿(0) = 1 and
￿(￿) is 1 only if DF;t = 0. Furthermore ￿(￿) has to be a di¤erentiable, decreasing function in the
neighborhood of zero.


















9See Benigno (2009) for a generalized asset trading framework, that follows Ghironi et al. (2007).
10We introduce this cost to ensure stationarity, see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003).



































1￿￿ are the price
indexes for domestic and imported goods, whereby the latter is expressed in domestic currency.
Finally, the optimal condition of expenditures between domestic and imported goods is given
by



















1￿￿ Pt is the consumer price index (CPI) in country H. Note
that if the economy is closed, ￿ = 0; the CPI equals domestic prices. Correspondingly we can
write total consumption expenditures by domestic households as PtCt = PH;tCH;t+PF;tCF;t. The























t +(1￿￿t)(WtNt + ￿t)+PH;tTt: (3)
Maximizing (1) with respect to (3) yields the following FOCs:
C￿￿










































t + PH;t(Yt ￿ GH;t) ￿ PtCt) (7)
Equation (4) is the standard Euler equation and determines the consumption smoothing
behaviour of the households. Equation (5) is the Euler equation derived from the optimal choice
of the foreign bond. Equation (6) is the standard labour supply condition. It determines the
quantity of labor supplied as a function of real wage, given the marginal utility of consumption.
Finally, equation (7) is the aggregate budget constraint, which is obtained by aggregating the
5budget constraints of the households together with the government budget constraint (de…ned
below). To derive this equation we also assume that output is distributed over wage and pro…ts
WtNt + ￿t = PH;tYt.


















In contrast to the complete market case the monotonic relationship linking consumption with
world consumption and ToT/ real exchange rate (see e.g. Galí and Monacelli (2005)) breaks down.
The incomplete …nancial market framework generates deviations from the uncovered interest
parity (UIP). Combining (4) and (5) yields the optimal portfolio choice of the households of
country H







where we simpli…ed dt =
EtDF;t+1
Pt . ￿(dt) can also be interpreted as a risk premium term on the
exchange rate.12 If the economy is a net debtor, the domestic interest rate is above the foreign
interest rate and if the economy is a net creditor the domestic interest rate is below the foreign
interest rate. Therefore movements in the net foreign asset positions a¤ect the interest di¤erential
between the two countries.























Note that if dt ￿ 0 then ￿(dt) = 1 and the above equation simpli…es to the standard international
risk sharing relationship which is obtained in a complete securities markets setting (see e.g. Galí
and Monacelli (2005)).
2.2 Price and Exchange Rate Identities
The terms of trade are de…ned as the price of foreign goods relative to the price of goods produced





Note that in this framework the PPP does not hold in the short run, because of the presence of
home bias in consumption. However, PPP holds in a symmetric steady state PH = PF. Following
Galí and Monacelli (2005) the foreign price index P￿
t equals the foreign price of imported goods
PF;t. This results from the de…nition of the rest of the world as closed economy, implying that
11Because of Walras Law the foreign budget constraint is redundant (see Benigno (2001)).
12For empirical evidence and possible explanations of such a risk premium see e.g. Bergin (2006).
6country H goods production is a negligible fraction of the world’s consumption basket. Hence it
follows ￿￿
t = ￿F;t for all t; where ￿t = Pt
Pt￿1.
Under the assumption of free-trade in all goods the law of one price holds for all individual
goods at all times and implies
PF;t(j) = EtP￿
F;t(j);
for all j 2 [0;1]. Et is the nominal exchange rate and P￿
F;T(j) is the price of a foreign good
expressed in foreign currency. Aggregating across all goods implies
PF;t = EtP￿
F;t:








The government only provides goods and services which are produced in the domestic country.










; ￿ > 1
where GH;t(j) is the quantity of domestic good j purchased by the government. The demand













= Dt + PH;t(Gt + Tt) ￿ ￿PH;tYt;
where ￿ is a tax on the nominal income of the domestic households and GH;t is government
spending, whereby both are exogenous and …nanced by lump-sum taxes/ transfers Tt.
2.4 Firms
2.4.1 Technology
There is a continuum of monopolistic competitive …rms j 2 [0;1] in both countries and each …rm
produces a di¤erentiated good with a linear technology, represented by the production function
Yt(j) = AtNt(j);
















is the aggregate output index of country H.














The prices are set by monopolistic competitive …rms facing price stickiness in a framework pro-
posed by Calvo (1983). Calvo assumes that each period, there is a constant probability 1￿￿ for
a …rm to adjust its price. This probability does not depend on the history of past price changes,
but only on the random signal ￿. The expected time between price adjustments is 1=(1 ￿ ￿). If
the law of large numbers holds this implies that the fraction of …rms not setting prices in period
t is ￿: The parameter ￿ measures the degree of nominal rigidity and a larger ￿ implies a higher
degree of price stickiness. Firms not changing the price adjust their output to meet demand.
Since the problem is symmetric, every …rm faces the same decision problem and will choose the
same optimal price PH;t, if it is allowed to reset in period t.























where PH;t(j) is the price set by …rm j adjusting its price in the current period and Qt;t+s =
￿s(Ct=Ct+s)￿(Pt=Pt+s) is the subjective discount factor of the households. The FOC gives the




















13For the derivation of the FOC and the NKPC see e.g. Galí and Monacelli (2005).









Note that the price dynamics are a function of its last period value and the expected future path;
other past prices are not needed. The exclusion of other past prices is a result of the assumption
of speci…c factor markets.14.
2.5 Equilibrium
2.5.1 Market clearing conditions
The output of the small open economy can either be consumed domestically by the households
or the government or can be exported. Assume that C￿
H;t(j) is the world demand for domestic
good j. Hence market clearing for good j requires










































2.5.2 Rest of the World
In this section we derive the dynamic system that describes the evolution of the economic variables
in the world economy. Essentially we impose a dynamic structure on the system of shocks that
a¤ect the small open economy.
Let ^ Xt = logXt￿logX denote the log-deviation of variable Xt from its steady state value X.
We also denote ^ Xn
t log-deviations of variables from their steady state values in the ‡exible price
equilibrium. The …nal log-linearised system of …rst order conditions for the Rest of the World
consists of the Euler equation (9) and Phillips curve (10):
^ C￿











t = ￿Et^ ￿￿
t+1 +
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿
￿
(￿ + ￿) ^ C￿












9We assume that the policymaker in the rest of the world solves a conventional in‡ation tar-













We assume that the policymaker acts under commitment. Such a policy choice ensures price
level stability in the rest of the world. Since an exchange rate peg is often used to ‘import’ foreign
in‡ation, the above choice of a price-stable foreign economy is important to ensure stability of
the small open economy.
It is straightforward to demonstrate that the evolution of the rest of the world under control
can be described by the following system
￿1t = z10￿￿
t + z11￿1t￿1 + z12￿2t￿1; (11)
￿2t = z20￿￿
t + z21￿1t￿1 + z22￿2t￿1; (12)
^ ￿￿
t = n￿0￿￿
t + n￿1￿1t￿1 + n￿2￿2t￿1; (13)
^ C￿
t = nc0￿￿







t + f1￿1t￿1 + f2￿2t￿1 ￿




where ￿1t and ￿2t are two Lagrange multipliers (that are set to zero in the initial moment) and
all coe¢cients z, n and f are found numerically (see Söderlind (1999) among many others on
solution algorithms). System (11)-(15) determines stochastic processes {^ {￿
t; ^ C￿
t ; ^ ￿￿
t} as functions
of shocks { ^ A￿
t;￿￿





t+1 = ￿a￿ ^ A￿
t + "a;t+1:
The small open economy is essentially a¤ected by a system of shocks with a complex autoregressive
structure, described by system (11)-(15).
2.5.3 Small Open Economy
In line with Benigno (2001) and De Paoli (2009b) we assume a symmetric steady state, which
implies that the net foreign asset position is zero in the steady state.16 The …nal log-linearised
15See Woodford (2003). Here ! =
(1￿￿)(1￿￿￿)
￿" :
16Although non-zero steady state holdings of foreign assets seems to be the empirical case (see e.g.Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2002)) the simpli…cation does not alter our results.
10system of …rst order conditions consists of the following equations:17




^ {t ￿ Et^ ￿H;t+1 ￿ ￿
￿
^ St+1 ￿ ^ St
￿￿
; (16)
^ ￿Ht = ￿Et^ ￿Ht+1 + ￿
￿
￿ ^ Ct + ￿^ Yt + ￿^ St ￿ (￿ + 1) ^ At
￿
+ ￿t; (17)
^ Yt = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) ^ Ct ￿ ￿￿(￿ ￿ 2)(1 ￿ ￿) ^ St + ￿(1 ￿ ￿) ^ C￿
t + ￿ ^ Gt; (18)
^ {t = ^ {￿
t ￿ ^ Et + Et ^ Et+1 ￿ ￿ ^ dt; (19)
￿ ^ dt = ^ dt￿1 + ^ Yt ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿) ^ St ￿ ￿ ^ GH;t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ^ Ct; (20)
^ Et = ^ St ￿ ^ pH;t + ^ p￿
t; (21)
^ pH;t = ^ pH;t￿1 + ^ ￿H;t: (22)
where ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)=￿:Optimal decisions of the household are described by the Euler equa-
tion (16) and by a standard New Keynesian Phillips curve (17). The national income identity
equation (18) states that domestic output is positively related to government spending and con-
sumption of the rest of the world. It is negatively related to improvements in the terms of trade
(S #), because ￿ < 1 and ￿ > 0. An improvement in the terms of trade will lead to a shift in
household’s consumption towards foreign goods. The expression in front of the terms of trade can
be interpreted as an ‘expenditure switching’ factor which is increasing in ￿. The described setup
allows for deviations from the uncovered interest parity (equation (19)). There is a time varying
risk-premium that depends on both the net foreign asset position of the country ^ dt and a cost of
bond holdings ￿: This risk premium could be positive or negative depending on the home country
being a borrower or a lender in the international assets market. Owing to the incomplete market
setting the Euler equation is not su¢cient to determine the dynamics of aggregate demand. We
also need equation (20) to pin down the dynamics of the net foreign assets, where the portfolio
cost parameter ￿ in‡uences the evolution of the net foreign assets through its impact on the terms
of trade. We also include de…nitions of terms of trade (21) and the price level (22).
The private sector rational expectations equilibrium consists of the plan f ^ Ct; ^ ￿Ht; ^ dt; ^ Yt;^ {t; ^ Et; ^ pH;tg








t ; ^ ￿￿
t;^ {￿
tg are functions of { ^ A￿
t;￿￿
t}, see equations (11)-(15)) and initial conditions ^ d0:
2.5.4 Timing of Events
The sequence of events and actions within a period is as follows. In the …rst stage of every period
t the state ^ dt￿1 is known and shock ￿t realizes. Then the policymaker chooses the value of ^ {t: The
policymaker knows the state ^ dt￿1 and takes the process by which private agents behave as given.
After the policymakers moved, in the next stage the private sector adjusts its choice variables ￿t
and ^ Ct: The optimal ￿t; ^ Ct , policy ^ {t and the nominal exchange rate ^ Et result in the new level
of ^ dt by the beginning of the next period t + 1:
17Note that we de…ne analogous to Benigno (2001) ^ dt as
dt￿d




We assume that the central bank uses nominal short-term interest rate ^ {t as an instrument. We

















where ! = ￿=" and ^ Y n
s is the natural rate of output (in the ‡exible price equilibrium without mark
up shocks). This welfare function has been shown by Woodford (2003a), Ch. 6, to approximate
the aggregate of individual utility functions in a closed economy model with complete …nancial
markets (with ￿ = 0). In our model, this approximation will not hold up to the second order and
so our policy objective function is to some degree ad hoc. However, as King and Wolman (2004)
and Blake and Kirsanova (2008) argue, multiplicity under discretion is not a consequence of a
particularly ‘unfortunate’ form of social welfare, but rather a general property of discretionary
policy, as the private sector and the policymaker make decisions based on forecast of each other’s
actions.18 In what follows we simply refer to this objective as to the social objective. We also
label (23) as ‘in‡ation targeting regime’. Note that we do this for convenience and not to take a
stand on the optimality or the precise nature of in‡ation targeting regimes as practiced in real
life.
2.6.2 The benchmark Ramsey allocation
The Ramsey allocation takes into account the presence of distortions, as summarised by con-










subject to constraints (16)–(22) for all t ￿ 0:19
The Ramsey allocation requires commitment to policy. In what follows we term the solution
as the commitment solution. We use the commitment solution as the benchmark case for welfare
evaluations.
18Note that we also abstract from the terms of trade externality (e.g. Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1998), Corsetti and
Pesenti (2001)). In an open economy the policymaker may have the incentive to in‡uence the terms-of-trade in
a way beni…cal to domestic households. Assuming fully optimal time-inconsistent policy, De Paoli (2009a) shows
that in a small open economy an improvement in the terms-of-trade can increase the welfare of the households, if
domestic and foreign goods are close substitutes. In this case domestic households consume more imported goods
and can therefore reduce their labor e¤ort without a corresponding fall in consumption levels. This derivation,
however, is not suitable for our model with discretionary policy and we prefer to use a more traditional alternative.
The volatility of the terms of trade does a¤ect welfare but only because it a¤ects the volatility of output gap.
19Note that the central bank uses the interest rate gap it = ^ {t ￿^ {
n
t as its instrument.
122.6.3 Nominal Exchange Rate Targeting under Discretion











^ Ys ￿ ^ Y n
s
￿2




where we impose an additional weight on stabilisation of nominal exchange rate around the steady
state value.
If !e = 0 then we have the standard in‡ation targeting regime with the policy objective W￿
t .
We shall study it as one extreme case.







We shall label this scenario as ‘soft peg’ and study it as another important extreme case of partial
nominal exchange rate targeting (24). This targeting regime has some similarities with a …xed
exchange rate regime. In particular, this regime assumes that the policymaker announces the
target, perhaps within a corridor (which we do not model as binding in any way, so it does
not a¤ect expectations of the private sector) and uses the short term interest rate to keep the
exchange rate on target. The exchange rate, however, is allowed to deviate from the target,
although such deviations are costly. We distinguish this regime from the ‘hard peg’ where the
monetary policymaker is prepared to sell any quantity of reserves at a given price to keep the
exchange rate exactly on target. The hard peg cannot be modelled with a quadratic loss function
– any regime with quadratic loss function allows (costly) deviations from the parity while the
hard peg regime does not. Another way to model …xed exchange rate regime could be to assume
a simple interest rate rule that feeds back on exchange rate deviations from their target (see
e.g.Galí and Monacelli (2005)). Deviations from the target are possible under this regime, but
such rules require credible commitment which may not always be possible in a developing country.
2.7 Calibration
We set the subjective discount rate ￿ = 0:99, which implies a steady state real interest rate
slightly above 4% (in a quarterly model). Following Beetsma and Jensen (2004) we set ' = 3,
which implies the Frisch-elasticity of labour supply of 1=3. The degree of price stickiness is given
by ￿ = 0:75, so price contracts last on average for one year (see e.g. Smets and Wouters (2003)).
In line with Galí and Monacelli (2005) we set the steady state markup ￿ = 1:2, which implies
that the elasticity of substitution ￿ is equal to 6; we also set the government share of output ￿ as
0.25. This value is in line with Galí and Monacelli (2005) and roughly consistent with European
data. In the benchmark calibration we assume a unitary coe¢cient of risk sharing ￿ implying
a log utility function. Following Benigno (2009) we set ￿ = 0:01 which implies a 10 basis point
spread of the domestic interest rate over the foreign one. For the elasticity of substitution we
assume ￿ = 3 (Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1998)). Finally, cost push shocks are assumed to be i.i.d. and
technology shocks follows the following AR(1) process with persistence parameter ￿a = ￿a￿ = 0:8.
The standard deviation of cost push shock is 0.005 and of a productivity shock it is 0.0075.
133 Discretionary Equilibria
We start with the benchmark in‡ation targeting regime and discuss arising discretionary equi-
libria. We then continue with the extreme case of a ‘soft peg’ as this is the most simple setting
to discuss problems that might arise if a country targets exchange rate. We intentionally ignore
all other possible targets of the central bank for simplicity and clarity. We then check for ro-
bustness of our results. Finally we investigate the intermediate case of ‘partial’ exchange rate
targeting where the central bank puts some weight in its loss function to exchange rate deviations
additionally to the standard in‡ation targeting regime.
3.1 In‡ation Targeting Regime
In the in‡ation targeting regime the policymaker uses the social welfare function W￿
t : The evo-
lution of the economy can be rewritten as:
￿ ^ dt = ^ dt￿1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿) ^ Ct + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ (2 ￿ ￿) ￿ 1) ^ St + ￿(1 ￿ ￿) ^ C￿
t ;
^ {t = Et ^ St+1 ￿ ^ St + Et￿H;t+1 ￿ ￿ ^ dt +^ {￿
t;




^ {t ￿ Et^ ￿H;t+1 ￿ ￿
￿
Et ^ St+1 ￿ ^ St
￿￿
;
^ ￿Ht = ￿Et^ ￿Ht+1 + ￿(￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)) ^ Ct + ￿￿(1 + ￿￿ (2 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)) ^ St
+￿￿￿(1 ￿ ￿) ^ C￿
t + ￿￿￿ ^ Gt ￿ ￿(￿ + 1) ^ At + ￿t;
where we substituted all static equations and left only dynamic relationships.
There is only one predetermined endogenous state variable, net foreign assets ^ dt￿1; three non-
predetermined endogenous state variables, ^ Ct; ^ ￿Ht and ^ St; one instrument ^ {t; and two shocks, ￿t
and ￿￿
t; whereby ^ {￿
t; ^ C￿
t and ￿￿
t are all functions of ￿￿
t:
3.1.1 The Two Equilibria
The baseline calibration leads to two discretionary equilibria under the policy of in‡ation target-
ing. The upper panel of Figure 1 demonstrates, that following an initial current account de…cit
the economy can follow one of the two transition paths, both of which satisfy the …rst-order con-
ditions for optimality and time-consistency. They correspond to the two IE-stable discretionary
equilibria described in the Appendix B. The corresponding adjustment paths are plotted using
either solid or dashed lines.
When the economy starts out of the steady state with a negative net foreign assets position
the household will wish to adjust. The household will choose consumption and prices, taking into
account the future paths of the interest rate as well as the state of the economy. The policymaker
will use its policy instrument, the interest rate, to help to steer the economy back to the steady
state; he will choose the interest rate optimally, based on the forecast of the reaction of the
household to the policy and to the state of the economy.
Choosing the adjustment paths the household can foresee that the negative position in net
foreign assets can be closed either quickly, if the interest rate falls sharply with a consequent
depreciation of domestic currency, trade surplus and accumulation of net foreign assets, or it
can be closed slowly if the interest rate rises only slightly with only a small consequent fall in
14consumption and therefore a slow accumulation of net foreign assets. Depending on whether
adjustment is expected to be slow or fast, the private sector will set corresponding expectations
and appropriate prices. It will be optimal for the policymaker to validate the beliefs that will
prevail. Two equilibria arise.
These di¤erent adjustment paths can be explained by the multiplicity of policy-induced private
sector equilibria, see Blake and Kirsanova (2008). Essentially, for every policy there is more than
one locally optimal response of the private sector, which is of course, conditional on the forecast
of future policy. In order to understand how multiplicity arise we can look at the role which
consumption and the terms of trade play in the determination of the law of motion for marginal
costs. After some algebra, the deterministic component of the marginal cost can be written out
as:
c mct = (￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)) ^ Ct + ￿(1 + ￿￿ (2 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)) ^ St:
It is apparent that consumption and the terms of trade are strategic complements in the control
of in‡ation. When a positive cost-push shock hits the system the policymaker rises the interest
rate and consumption is cut. Terms of trade improve. Households will use the current account
to smooth consumption and decumulate net foreign assets The improved terms of trade reduce
marginal cost even further. In other words, following an interest rate increase, the e¤ect of
consumption on the terms of trade reinforces the e¤ect of the interest rate on the terms of trade,
so we have a strategic complementarity as de…ned, for example, in Cooper and John (1988).
Multiplicity of the policy-induced private sector equilibria becomes a likely outcome: household
may choose to react in several possible ways – here they are ‘slow’ and ‘fast’ – each of them
is consistent with a given policy forecast. Of course, the policymaker will react di¤erently in
response to di¤erent household actions, but the household will update their forecasts of policy in
both scenarios. We end up with two discretionary equilibria and the policymaker validates beliefs
in each particular equilibrium. In presence of the two equilibria, coordination failure happens:
the household and the private sector can choose any of the two. A sunspot decides which one
will realise as we discuss in more details in the next section.
In order to illustrate the mechanism in a stochastic setting, we plot the impulse responses to a
unit cost push shock in the home economy in the middle panel of Figure 1. The shock is absorbed
via a temporary fall in home output and consumption and by an initial jump in home in‡ation.
The central bank …ghts in‡ation through an increase in the interest rate. After the shock, output
and consumption converge to their steady states and the price level converges as well to the steady
state through periods of (a very small) de‡ation. Households use the current account as a risk-
sharing tool and sell foreign assets to dampen the decline in consumption. Therefore the country
will run a current account de…cit. The fall in output improves the home country terms-of-trade.
As described above the baseline calibration produces two stable discretionary equilibria. The slow
adjustment solution to the problem is to raise the nominal interest rate sharply, resulting in a fall
in demand, low in‡ation and a sharp appreciation of domestic currency. As a result the value of
net foreign assets will be sharply reduced …rst and then gradually accumulated back to the initial
level while the other variables stay close to their equilibrium levels in subsequent periods.
If the economy is hit by an external cost-push shock, the foreign interest rate is raised, foreign
consumption falls, the terms of trade improve and the value of foreign bonds increases. The home
interest rate is raised in both regimes and therefore enforces the decline in consumption. In the
15slow regime it is raised by less. This results in a lower decline of consumption and therefore a
stronger accumulation of net foreign assets, a small de‡ation and still depreciated terms of trade.
When the interest rate is moved down below the baseline this results in higher in‡ation, small
improvement of the terms of trade and still a higher foreign asset position. The accumulated
net foreign assets converge slowly to the steady state in the second period and the consequent
appreciated terms of trade gradually reduces in‡ation back to the steady state.
In the fast regime the interest rate is raised by much, the nominal exchange rate appreciate
and consumption falls by much. As a result the terms of trade appreciate, net foreign assets
accumulate and domestic in‡ation becomes negative. The positive position in net foreign assets
causes consequent depreciation of the terms of trade, high in‡ation and overall price level stability.
Note that the nominal exchange rate does not converge back to its initial value in any of
the stochastic regimes. The terms of trade are stabilised, but both price level and the nominal
exchange rate are unit root variables.
The responses to a positive cost-push shock for both cases look as if they were produced by
the application of the classic problem of ‘dry’ and ‘wet’ policymakers (Barro and Gordon (1983)),
adapted for a dynamic setting (see e.g. the discussion of the conservative central bank proposal
in a dynamic setting in Clarida et al. (1999), p. 1677). In both scenarios, the interest rate rises in
response to the shock, but in one scenario it rises by much more. As a result, and as in the ‘dry’
versus ‘wet’ example, we have the bigger fall in output and less in‡ation in the …rst scenario than
in the second. However, rather di¤erently from the classic problem, we have two locally optimal
responses under identical policy objectives.
Based on our observations, the two discretionary solutions can also be seen as the product of
‘seemingly patient’ respectively ‘seemingly impatient’ policymakers, with their degree of patience
determined by the speed of the adjustment process of the economy back to the steady state. This
distinction has nothing to do with the discount factor in the objective functions, as they remain
the same. As we argue next, households/ …rms make decisions based on the forecast of future
policy: They either decide to bear or not the cost of adjustment. The private sector, thus, chooses
the equilibrium. The policymaker has no choice but to validate the forecast. We will investigate
this in the following section in more detail.
3.1.2 Policy traps and equilibrium selection
Table 1 reports the welfare losses for the baseline calibration for di¤erent regimes. We claim
that despite there is a clear di¤erence in welfare ranking of the two regimes, the discretionary
policymaker is unable to choose the one which yields the highest welfare. Multiplicity can only
exist if there is a multiplicity of beliefs, shared by the private sector and the policymaker, about
the future course of policy. The discretionary policymaker is unable to manipulate the private
sector’s beliefs in order to choose the best equilibrium globally. To understand this, it is instructive
to compare what is happening in commitment and discretionary equilibria. Under commitment
the policymaker is able to manipulate the private sector’s expectations along the whole future path,
and thus, by implication, is able to choose the best path for all variables including beliefs. The
discretionary policymaker is only able to manipulate private sector beliefs within a single period t.
This is because the discretionary policymaker acts as an intra-period Stackelberg leader, see Cohen
and Michel (1988), sections 4 and 5. However, the policy choice in period t has to be consistent








































































































































STOCHASTIC MODEL: DOMESTIC COST PUSH SHOCK
































































































































STOCHASTIC MODEL: EXTERNAL COST PUSH SHOCK




























































































slow equilibrium fast equilibrium
Figure 1: In‡ation Targeting
17Policymaker Policy Equilibrium Loss
‘Seemingly Dry’ and ‘Patient’ With slow adjustment 0.278
‘Seemingly Wet’ and ‘Impatient’ With fast adjustment 3.419
Reputational Fully Optimal 0.250
Table 1: Social Welfare Loss, % of steady state consumption.
with (or conditional on) beliefs set in previous periods if there are endogenous predetermined state
variables in the model. These past-period beliefs cannot be changed retrospectively. Once they
are set their e¤ect is long-lasting and so at time t the policymaker has to take into account the
future evolution of the economy which has been a¤ected by beliefs set prior to period t. (Again,
unlike the case of commitment there is no ‘period 0’ when a policymaker has the power to ‘change
everything’ irrespective of history.) In this sense, the private sector ‘traps’ the policymaker in a
particular equilibrium.
In our model the net foreign asset position is an endogenous predetermined state variable.
Their evolution is determined by consumption/ output and the terms of trade (and thus by
price-setting behaviour). Consumption and prices are chosen based on the forecasted path of
all variables including foreign assets. The household (who owns all …rms too) is either willing
or not to adjust prices and consumption in response to a shock. Its choice depends on beliefs
about how quickly any adjustment will happen, and only on this. The household does not face
such a choice in a world with perfect …nancial markets, i.e. with no predetermined endogenous
variables. In this case the economy once disturbed converges back to the steady state within a
single period. All monetary policy can do is to reduce the amplitude of the immediate reactions
of economic variables to shocks. The feedback coe¢cient of the policy rule on the observed shocks
is responsible for this reduction. If there are predetermined variables in the system, then policy
can also reduce the half-life of the e¤ects of shocks already in the system. This stabilization
e¤ectively reduces the size of the non-explosive non-zero eigenvalues of the system under control.
The feedback coe¢cients of the endogenous predetermined variables are responsible for this.
These two tasks are completely orthogonal to each other, i.e. two rules which only di¤er in
the feedback coe¢cients on shocks will ensure the same half-life, and two rules which only di¤er
by feedback coe¢cients on predetermined (dynamic) states will identically reduce the amplitude
of concurrent shocks. The private sector can perceive the policymaker as either being ‘quick’
or ‘slow’ to stabilize the economy. These expectations decide about the …rst-period position in
foreign assets. In turn, these expectation a¤ect the economy more than one period into the future,
as they are embedded in the dynamics of the net foreign assets. Any implied future dynamics
of the economy are necessarily taken into account by future policy. The impulse responses to
a cost-push shock in Figure 1 certainly resemble a policymaker that is either ‘dry/patient’ or
‘wet/impatient’. However, this is because the policymaker has to use the initial movement in
interest rates to o¤set private sector perceptions of bringing back the economy either ‘quick’ or
‘slow’ to its steady state; the policymaker has to stick to this policy in the future.
In what follows we will term these equilibria as quick/fast and slow.
183.2 Nominal Exchange Rate Targeting
We start with the second extreme case, the ‘soft peg’. We completely ignore other targets, which
may not be realistic, but the resulting regime is a useful simpli…cation to illustrate our main
point.20 Under the ‘soft peg’, the reduced form system in log-linearised form can be written as:
￿ ^ dt = ^ dt￿1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿) ^ Ct + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ (2 ￿ ￿) ￿ 1)
￿
^ Et + ^ pH;t ￿ ^ p￿
t
￿
+ ￿(1 ￿ ￿) ^ C￿
t ;
^ {t = ^ {￿
t + Et ^ Et+1 ￿ ^ Et ￿ ￿ ^ dt;




^ {t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Et^ ￿Ht+1 ￿ ￿
￿
Et ^ Et+1 ￿ ^ Et
￿￿
;
^ ￿Ht = ￿Et^ ￿Ht+1 + ￿(￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)) ^ Ct + ￿￿(1 + ￿￿ (2 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿))
￿
^ Et + ^ pH;t ￿ ^ p￿
t
￿
+￿￿￿(1 ￿ ￿) ^ C￿
t + ￿￿￿ ^ Gt ￿ ￿(￿ + 1) ^ At + ￿t;
^ pH;t = ^ pH;t￿1 + ^ ￿H;t:
Di¤erent from the version in the previous section there are two predetermined endogenous state
variables: net foreign assets and the price level, ^ dt￿1 and ^ pH;t￿1: The non-predetermined variables
are ^ Et; ^ ￿H;t and ^ Ct: There are two shocks, ￿t and ￿￿
t; whereby ^ {￿
t; ^ C￿
t and ￿￿
t are all functions
of ￿￿
t: Unlike under in‡ation targeting, we cannot substitute the nominal exchange rate and the
price level into only one variable, the terms of trade. We have to account for the dynamics of the
nominal exchange rate separately because it is the goal variable of the policymaker.
3.2.1 The ‘soft peg’
We start with the claim that under the ‘soft peg’ it is possible to keep the exchange rate on
target all the time.21 Suppose we are in the deterministic version of the model and the economy
starts with an excessive foreign debt. This scenario is plotted in the upper panel of Figure 2 by
the solid line. In order to steer the economy back to the steady state the policymaker moves the
interest rate based on the forecast of the future net foreign asset position and of the expected
future depreciation. If there is a common belief that the nominal exchange rate will remain in
the steady state in the future, it will be optimal for the policymaker to raise the interest rate by
little, to o¤set ￿ ^ dt. There will be slight fall in consumption and in‡ation. As a result, the small
increase in savings will dominate the e¤ect of the improvement in the terms of trade on the net
foreign assets. Net foreign assets will grow by little in the next period and this will require a
small positive interest rate until the process converges to the steady state. The nominal exchange
rate will remain in the steady state, i.e. the forecast will be validated by the policymaker.
However, the equilibrium with stable nominal exchange rate is not the only one.22 The second
possible adjustment path is plotted in the upper panel of Figure 2 with a dashed line. Following
an initial negative position in foreign debt and if there is a commonly shared belief in future
appreciation of the nominal exchange rate, it is optimal for the central bank to reduce interest
rate sharply, causing immediate currency depreciation and a rise in consumption and in‡ation.
20We study at the general case of nominal exchange rate targeting below in Section 3.2.2.
21This is a standard result in this strand of literature, see e.g. Galí and Monacelli (2005).
22The procedure to …nd all equilibria is the same as in the case of in‡ation targeting which we discuss in details
in Appendix B.
















































































































































STOCHASTIC MODEL: DOMESTIC COST PUSH SHOCK

































































































































STOCHASTIC MODEL: EXTERNAL COST PUSH SHOCK


















































































slow equilibrium fast equilibrium
Figure 2: Exchange Rate Targeting
20The terms of trade worsen and savings rise. This results in quick accumulation of foreign assets.
A higher level of foreign assets pushes the optimal interest rate to fall even further. In other
words, there is a complementarity between the interest rate and foreign assets: a reduction
in the interest rate raises foreign assets that require again a lower equilibrium interest rate.
With complementarities, multiplicity of equilibria becomes a likely outcome. Therefore it is not
surprising that this outcome has realised in this model.
The ‘soft peg’ requires that the price level returns to its initial level. Therefore we should
observe in‡ation overshooting and, indeed, this is achieved in the second equilibrium by lowering
the interest rate sharply. The decline in the interest rate generates an increase in consumption
and a depreciation of the terms of trade which both generate an increase in the value of the stock
of net foreign assets above its steady state level. When the interest rate is raised back to its
baseline level, this higher value of net foreign assets creates an additional pressure on the terms
of trade. The terms of trade overshoot, improve and stay below their baseline level for a number
of periods. The e¤ect on marginal cost generates in‡ation overshooting and price level stability.
The nominal exchange rate is stabilised at its initial level.
Despite it is commonly suggested that currency pegging is an e¢cient way to import low and
stable in‡ation, it is apparent that in the case of a ‘soft peg’ the implied volatility of the nominal
exchange rate and domestic in‡ation in the worst regime is higher than it is in the case of in‡ation
targeting. This is not surprising: these are two ‘second-best’ scenarios, and there cannot be any
a priori ranking between them. Also, the welfare minimisation in the ‘soft peg’ case assumes
that both predetermined states (foreign assets and prices) can be out of the steady state so their
volatility should be minimised ‘on average’, see Currie and Levine (1985). This is contrary to the
in‡ation targeting regime where only one predetermined state exists.
The middle panel of Figure 2 plots the impulse responses to a domestic cost push shock. In
the slow equilibrium in‡ation is accommodated: the interest rate is only marginally raised in
response to the shock, and consumption falls only slightly. The terms of trade improve and the
net foreign wealth loses in value. The negative net foreign assets position pushes the interest rate
even further and consumption remains substantially below the baseline. This fall in consumption
becomes large and long enough to reduce the marginal cost below the baseline, so in‡ation will
fall sharply, the terms of trade will worsen and net foreign assets start to accumulate again.
(In‡ation falls su¢ciently low to ensure price level stability.) The same mechanism then works
to steer the economy back to the steady state.
In the fast equilibrium in‡ation is also accommodated with a fall in the interest rate. If there
is a common belief that the currency will appreciate in the future it is optimal for the policymaker
to lower the interest rate now, create an immediate depreciation and worsen the terms of trade,
which all leads to a rise in the real value of foreign assets. The expected appreciation drives private
consumption down below the baseline, marginal costs follow and in‡ation is reduced below the
baseline. The terms of trade improve and households start to decumulate net foreign assets. There
will be less pressure to keep the interest rate low and the economy gradually converges back. A
substantial in‡ation overshooting guarantees price level stability and the nominal exchange rate
is on target.
Note that the existence of the second equilibrium does not depend on any credibility issues:
discretionary policy is credible by construction, the policymaker has never promised to keep the
nominal exchange rate on target. The policymaker has only promised to minimise volatility
21Policymaker Policy Equilibrium Loss
Good With slow adjustment 1.457
Bad With fast adjustment 5.770
Reputational (soft peg) Fully Optimal 1.457
Table 2: Social welfare Loss under Exchange Rate Targeting, % of steady state consumption
around the target. Therefore, it is acceptable to have deviations from the target as soon as
all agents know the target. The possibility of ‘future appreciation’, i.e. di¤erent speeds of
convergence towards the steady state, generates the second equilibrium.
The lower panel in Figure 2 demonstrates both equilibria if there is an external cost push
shock. Again, it is possible to o¤set the shock completely. If there is a common belief that the
nominal exchange rate will remain on target, the interest rate can be raised in order to o¤set the
e¤ect of the foreign interest rate on the economy. Consumption will fall, savings increase and
net foreign assets will rise. As the terms of trade have become worse after the foreign cost-push
shock, in‡ation will drive up in the second period. Consumption will rise and savings will fall so
net foreign assets start to decumulate. A consequent improvement in the terms of trade ensures
that the process of convergence is slow.
If, following an external cost push shock and a rise in the foreign interest rate, there is a
common belief that the currency can depreciate in the future, then the policymaker has to raise
the interest rate by more than if the currency is expected to be on target. This results in an
immediate appreciation of the currency and an improvement in the terms of trade. The terms of
trade e¤ect dominates all other e¤ects on the net foreign assets position – foreign assets lose in
value. The improved terms of trade result in higher marginal costs and an higher in‡ation. The
low real interest rate leads to an increase in consumption, so foreign assets start to accumulate
and the economy eventually converges back to the steady state.
Table 2 reports social losses computed in assumption that the economy starts in the steady
state and is then hit by internal and external cost-push and productivity shocks. These shocks are
distributed as explained in Section 2.7. The ‘slow’ discretionary equilibrium is able to replicate
the commitment equilibrium under the ‘soft peg’. In the ‘fast’ equilibrium the loss is substantially
higher.
3.2.2 Partial Exchange Rate Targeting
Suppose a country with true ‡ow social welfare metric
W￿
t = ^ ￿2
Ht + !y
￿
^ Yt ￿ ^ Y n
t
￿2
decides to put an additional weight on nominal exchange rate targeting (provided that the anchor
country pursues price stability) and chooses
Wt = ^ ￿2
Ht + !y
￿
^ Yt ￿ ^ Y n
t
￿2
+ !e ^ E2
t
as its ‡ow objective. Table 3 reports four results. In every line we measure the implied social loss

























































































































































slow equilibrium fast equilibrium commitment
Figure 3: Partial Exchange Rate Targeting
231=!e 0.0 0.1 0.5 1.0 5.0 10 20 30 40 50 1
!e 1 10 2 1.0 0.2 0.1 0.05 0.033 0.025 0.02 0
WS 1.457 1.432 1.340 1.238 0.759 0.527 0.376 0.328 0.308 0.297 0.278
WF 5.770 5.765 5.743 5.718 5.592 5.522 5.486 5.503 5.546 5.609 –
W￿;F – – – – – – – – – – 3.419
Loss under commitment in in‡ation targeting regime: 0.250
Table 3: Welfare Loss under the Partial Exchange Rate Targeting, % of steady state consumption.
Note that if !e = 0 then the fast equilibrium does not exist: we are in the regime of pure
in‡ation targeting, with two di¤erent equilibria, but the ‘wet/impatient’ equilibrium cannot be
obtained from the fast equilibrium under the partial exchange rate targeting by tending !e to zero.
We report the loss W￿;F in the …fth line for comparison – this is the loss in the wet/impatient
equilibrium under the pure in‡ation targeting. Note that the welfare losses for the fast equilibrium
are higher in the partial exchange rate targeting regime than in the pure in‡ation targeting regime.
In contrast to policy under commitment, adding additional targets to the social objective
of a discretionary policymaker can improve the overall policy outcome. There are many known
examples of ‘optimal delegation’, among others Woodford (2003b) on interest rate smoothing,
Walsh (2003) on speed-limit policy and Svensson (1999) and Vestin (2006) on price level targeting.
Apparently, an additional exchange rate target does not play a similar role. Lines two and three
in Table 3 report social welfare for the partial exchange rate targeting scenarios for the two
equilibria, slow and fast (S and F). The social loss monotonically rises with !e in the best (slow)
equilibrium. The social loss in the fast equilibrium can be slightly reduced with an appropriate
choice of !e (!e = 0:05). However the improvement is only marginal. Moreover, the introduction
of the exchange rate target into the otherwise social welfare function is the reason for the existence
of the worst equilibrium. We therefore conclude that exchange rate targeting does not solve ‘the
problem of optimal delegation’ and is not desirable.
Figure 3 plots the impulse responses of an external cost push shock under the three regimes.
The dotted line plots the commitment solution under pure in‡ation targeting (i.e. using the social
welfare function). This is the best possible outcome. The solid and the dashed lines demonstrate
responses under discretion when the policymaker imposes !e = 0:05: The impulse responses are
very similar to those plotted in the third panel of Figure 2, there are only small di¤erences because
of the inability to keep the exchange rate exactly on target.
4 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates how a mainstream open economy model with incomplete …nancial mar-
kets can have multiple equilibria under discretionary monetary policy. A policymaker with a
given objective can choose to stabilize the economy either slowly or quickly. Depending on pri-
vate sector beliefs how fast the economy will adjust back to its steady state one of these equilibria
will prevail.
We demonstrate that the introduction of nominal exchange rate targeting into the policy
24objective of a discretionary policymaker, that is commonly adopted in developing and emerging
countries, does not solve the ‘optimal delegation’ problem – it only leads to higher social losses.
We believe that the presented model is capable of explaining recent empirical evidence on
exchange rate behaviour: there can be switches in regime that are characterized by changes in
nominal exchange rate volatility. This can happen for a wide and realistic class of policy objec-
tives, as long as the policymaker acts under discretion and there is at least one predetermined
state variable in the system. A su¢ciently complex model with these features will retain multi-
plicity of equilibria and should be able to replicate the observed volatilities of key macroeconomic
variables, in particular the nominal exchange rate.
A Discretionary Policy in LQ RE Models
Our linearized model equations comprise a linear rational expectations model; the criterion func-
tions that our central bank will minimise are all quadratic. Our problem is therefore a special
case of a general class of linear-quadratic rational expectations regulator problems. In this short
section, we describe this general class of problems, and the types of equilibria that arise, formally.
We assume a non-singular linear deterministic rational expectations model of the type de-
scribed by Blanchard and Kahn (1980), augmented by a vector of control instruments. Speci…-



















where yt is an n1-vector of predetermined variables with initial conditions y0 given, xt is n2-
vector of non-predetermined (or jump) variables, and ut is a k￿vector of policy instruments of the
policymaker. For notational convenience we de…ne the n-vector zt = (y0
t;x0
t)0 where n = n1+n2.vEt
denotes the expectations operator, conditional on information available at time t:























subject to system (25). In addition, any solution to this optimization problem should satisfy the
time-consistency constraint: for any s > t the policymaker will choose
us = Etus: (28)
The elements of the vector gs are the goal variables of the policymaker, gs = C(z0
s;u0
s)0. Matrix
Q is assumed to be symmetric and positive semi-de…nite. In our formulation the quadratic loss
23We can work with the deterministic component only. This is without loss of generality because of certainty
equivalence (see e.g. Anderson et al. (1996)).
25function includes instrument costs, but no assumptions about the invertibility of R need be made.
We are looking for solutions that ensure that the loss is …nite, i.e. Wt < 1:
The sequence of actions within a period is as follows. In the …rst stage of every period t the
policymaker chooses the instrument ut; knowing the state yt and taking the process by which
private agents behave as given. In the second stage the private sector adjusts its choice variable
xt: The optimal xt; ut and given yt result in the new level of yt+1 by the beginning of the next
period t + 1:







and a pair of linear rules
ut = ￿Fyt; (29)
xt = ￿Jyt ￿ Kut = ￿(J ￿ KF)yt = ￿Nyt; (30)
where K = ￿@xt=@ut : in a leadership equilibrium the follower treats the leader’s policy in-
strument parametrically. Matrix F describes the policy reaction of the policymaker. Matrix N
de…nes the reduced form reaction function of the private sector.
If we …nd F and N then the evolution of the dynamic system under control can be written
as:
yt+1 = (A11 ￿ A12N ￿ B1F)yt = Myt; (31)
and the economy will be stable if all eigenvalues of transition matrix M are inside the unit circle.
De…nition 1 The system of …rst order conditions to optimization problem (25)-(28) for matrices
fN;S;Fg can be written in the following form:
S = Q￿ + ￿A￿0SA￿ ￿
￿
P￿0 + ￿B￿0SA￿￿0 F; (32)
F = (R￿ + ￿0B￿SB￿)￿1 ￿
P￿0 + ￿B￿0SA￿￿
; (33)
N = (A22 + NA12)￿1((A21 ￿ B2F) + N(A11 ￿ B1F)); (34)
Q￿ = Q11 ￿ Q12J ￿ J0Q21 + J0Q22J; P￿ = J0Q22K ￿ Q12K + P1 ￿ J0P2; (35)
R￿ = K0Q22K + R ￿ K0P2 ￿ P0
2K; A￿ = A11 ￿ A12J; B￿ = B1 ￿ A12K; (36)
J = (A22 + NA12)￿1(A21 + NA11); K = (A22 + NA12)￿1(B2 + NB1): (37)
The proof can be found in e.g. Blake and Kirsanova (2008). There is a one-to-one mapping
between equilibrium trajectories and fys;xs;usg
1
s=t and the triplet T = fN;S;Fg, so it is conve-
nient to continue with de…nition of policy equilibrium in terms of T , not trajectories. Hence, in
what follows it is convenient to use the following de…nition.
De…nition 2 A triplet T = fN;S;Fg is a discretionary equilibrium if it satis…es the system of
FOCs (32)-(37).
26It is apparent from system (32)-(37) that matrices N, S and F satisfy three quadratic algebraic
matrix equations (Riccati equations) (32)-(34), where the coe¢cients in these equations are also
non-linear functions of model matrices and matrix N: This makes the whole system (32)-(37) very
non-linear and it is not surprising that it may have many solution triplets T J = fNJ;SJ;FJg;
J = 1;::M where M is the total number of solutions. Blake and Kirsanova (2008) investigate
properties of these discretionary solutions and Dennis and Kirsanova (2009) discuss equilibrium
selection mechanisms. In the following we shall only consider equilibria that are Iterative Expec-
tations stable under joint learnig (see also Evans and Honkapohja (2001)).
B Discretionary Equilibria in In‡ation Targeting Regime
Following Appendix A we demonstrate how we …nd the discretionary equilibria under the regime
of in‡ation targeting.
B.1 The system in the matrix form
For the in‡ation targeting regime it is convenient to rewrite the dynamic system in the gap form
using the notation zt = ^ Zt ￿ ^ Zn
t for any variable Zt. We can substitute out all static variables
in order to come to the following reduced form optimization problem, written in a matrix form.
We only work with the deterministic part as the model is certainty equivalent and the stochastic
part can be added later in a unique way (Anderson et al. (1996)).

















￿2￿2! (2 ￿ ￿)
2 (1 ￿ ￿)
2 0 ￿￿! (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
2
0 1 0
￿￿! (1 ￿ ￿)(2 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
2 0 ! (1 ￿ ￿)


































































































Variables ct; ￿Ht and s are non-predetermined, while dt￿1 is a predetermined variable and it is









￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ (2 ￿ ￿) ￿ 1) 0 ￿￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
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￿2￿2! (2 ￿ ￿)
2 (1 ￿ ￿)
2 0 ￿￿! (1 ￿ ￿)(2 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
2
0 1 0
￿￿! (1 ￿ ￿)(2 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
2 0 ! (1 ￿ ￿)











B.2 The policymaker’s reaction function and the value function
Suppose the reaction of the private sector can be written in the following linear form with inde-






















and compute the following scalars (see equations (35)-(37)):
Q￿ = ! (1 ￿ ￿)
2 ￿2 ￿ 2! (1 ￿ ￿)￿2Jk ￿ 2￿! (1 ￿ ￿)￿Jc
+ J2
￿ + ￿2!J2
c + 2￿￿!JcJk + !￿2J2
k;
P￿ = !￿2KkJk + !￿￿KcJk + J￿K￿ + ￿!￿KkJc + ￿2!KcJc







Then, substitute steady state version of equation (33) into equation (32) and obtain a quadratic










28It is easy to show that the product of the two eigenvalues of the quadratic equation is negative:
P￿2 ￿ Q￿R￿ = ￿
!
￿2 (￿K￿ ￿ K￿ + ￿K￿ ￿ ￿￿K￿ ￿ J￿Kk + K￿Jk
+￿J￿Kk ￿ ￿K￿Jk ￿ ￿￿J￿Kc + ￿￿K￿Jc)
2 < 0:





Q￿B￿2 ￿ 2P￿B￿A￿ + R￿A￿2￿￿2 ￿ 4￿B￿2 ￿
P￿2 ￿ Q￿R￿￿
> 0;
as the second term is negative.
Therefore, the two eigenvalues of (38) are always real and of di¤erent signs. Since we are
looking for a positive value function S, the solution is unique. We can easily …nd it with conven-
tional methods for solving quadratic equations. Having found S we can uniquely determine the





Note that in equations (38) and (39) all coe¢cients depend on Jk, J￿, Jc, Kk, K￿, and Kc.
Equations (37) suggest that all J and K are, in their turn, functions of Nk;N￿ and Nc. Therefore
F = F(S(Nk;N￿;Nc)) = F(Nk;N￿;Nc) depends on the three coe¢cients of the reaction function
of the private sector.
B.3 The private sector’s reaction function
This section completes the analytical characterization of the solution to the problem. Here we
derive the private sector’s reaction function and construct private sector equilibria.
The pair of linear rules (29)-(30) yields the following reaction function for the policymaker:
it = ￿Fdt￿1;















The private sector’s reaction function solves (34), that is a system of three quadratic equations
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￿ (1 ￿ ￿) +
￿
￿









￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ (2 ￿ ￿) ￿ 1)
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￿
￿
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Note that the second equation is linear in N￿, does not contain F; and can be easily solved as
N￿ = N￿(Ns;Nc): We can substitute out N￿ from the …rst and the third equation and come to a
two-equation polynomial system (40) and (42), that can be easily solved numerically. We plot so-
lutions to each equation in the top panel of Figure 4. When these lines intersect we have a solution
to the system (40) and (42). They intersect at …ve points, denoted by circles and diamonds. Hav-
ing found all solutions for fNs(F);Nc(F)g we can also compute N￿ = N￿(Ns(F);Nc(F)) = N￿(F)
for each of them.
Given F we can substitute N into the dynamic system (31) and check that only two solutions,
denoted by circles in the top panel of Figure 4, ensure stability of the system; so all eigenvalues
of the matrix M are inside the unit circle. The other three solutions are unstable. Although the
stability properties can change if we vary F, we have checked that this is not the case. We will
ignore unstable solutions in what follows.
To summarize, for a given F we can …nd a solution triplet fNs(F);N￿(F);Nc(F)g, which
describes the equilibrium response of the private sector to a policy action. We have found …ve
private sector equilibria, as shown in Figure 4, top panel, but only two of them have economic
sense.
B.4 Discretionary solutions
A discretionary solution, by de…nition, is a triplet of matrices fN;S;Fg which is an asymptotically
stable steady state of system (32)-(34). In other words, all solutions can be described as pints of
intersection of solutions of the system (32)-(33) with solutions of equation (34), as we demonstrate
next.
The top panel of Figure 4 plots solution pairs fNc(F);Ns(F)g for a given value of F. If we
vary F then each of the …ve points becomes a one-dimensional curve in the three-dimensional
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Figure 4: Discretionary Solution
31space with coordinates Nc;Ns and F: Similarly, equations (38) and (39) de…ne F for every triplet
fNs;N￿;Ncg and, as N￿ = N￿(Ns;Nc); then F = F(Ns;Nc): This determines a two-dimensional
surface in the same three-dimensional space. Where these curves intersect the surface we have
discretionary solutions. We plot the surface and the two curves, that correspond to stable private
sector equilibria as described above, in the bottom panel of Figure 4. They intersect in four
points so there are four discretionary equilibria. We disregard two of them as they cannot be
located neither by backward induction as discussed in Blake and Kirsanova (2008) nor are they
Iterative Expectations-stable under joint learning as discussed in Dennis and Kirsanova (2009).
We discuss the economic properties of the remaining equilibria in the paper.
C Details of Derivations
C.1 Large closed economy (Rest of the World)
We assume that^ {￿
t is chosen optimally under commitment. This will guarantee price level stability
in the foreign country and give a convenient benchmark.
The problem is standard. Woodford (2003a) demonstrates that the policymaker will chose
interest rate gap i￿
t = ^ {￿
t ￿^ {￿n
















t = ^ ￿￿
t ￿ ^ ￿￿n
t is in‡ation gap and c￿
t = ^ C￿
t ￿ ^ C￿n
t is consumption (output) gap, and
^ ￿￿n
















t + z11￿1t￿1 + z12￿2t￿1;
￿2t = z20￿￿
t + z21￿1t￿1 ￿ 1 + z22￿2t￿1;
￿￿
t = n￿0￿￿
t + n￿1￿1t￿1 + n￿2￿2t￿1;
c￿
t = nc0￿￿
t + nc1￿1t￿1 + nc2￿2t￿1;
i￿
t = f0￿￿
t + f1￿1t￿1 + f2￿2t￿1:





t + z11￿1t￿1 + z12￿2t￿1;
￿2t = z20￿￿
t + z21￿1t￿1 + z22￿2t￿1;
^ ￿￿
t = n￿0￿￿
t + n￿1￿1t￿1 + n￿2￿2t￿1;
^ C￿
t = nc0￿￿







t + f1￿1t￿1 + f2￿2t￿1 ￿




32C.2 Small Open Economy: Natural Rates
The dynamic system for the ‡exible price equilibrium can be written as
￿ ^ dn
t = ^ dn
t￿1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿) ^ Cn
t ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿ (2 ￿ ￿)) ^ Sn
t + ￿(1 ￿ ￿) ^ C￿n
t ;
^ {n
t = ^ {￿n
t + ^ Sn

















0 = (￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)) ^ Cn
t + ￿(1 + ￿￿ (2 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)) ^ Sn
t
+￿￿(1 ￿ ￿) ^ C￿n
t + ￿￿ ^ Gt ￿ (￿ + 1) ^ At:
We substitute foreign natural rates and, after some manipulations, obtain:
￿ ^ dn
t = ^ dn
t￿1 + ￿d ^ Sn






t + ￿s ^ Sn
t + vt; (44)
where parameters are
￿d = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿(1 + ￿￿ (2 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿))
(￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿))





￿(1 + ￿￿ (2 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿))





























(￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿))
:
A solution to system (43)-(44) can be written as:
^ dn
t = ￿d ^ dn
t￿1 + ￿uut + ￿vvt;
^ Sn
t = sd ^ dn
t￿1 + ￿uut + ￿vvt;
and ^ {n
t and ^ Cn
t can be easily restored.
33C.3 Small Open Economy: Log-Linearised System
Log-linearised system:
￿ ^ dt = ^ dt￿1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿) ^ Ct + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ (2 ￿ ￿) ￿ 1) ^ St + ￿(1 ￿ ￿) ^ C￿
t
^ {t = ^ {￿
t + ^ St+1 ￿ ^ St + ￿H;t+1 ￿ ￿￿
t+1 ￿ ￿dt




^ {t ￿ ^ ￿H;t+1 ￿ ￿
￿
^ St+1 ￿ ^ St
￿￿
^ ￿Ht = ￿Et^ ￿Ht+1 + ￿
￿
(￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)) ^ Ct + ￿(1 + ￿￿ (2 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)) ^ St
￿
+￿￿￿(1 ￿ ￿) ^ C￿
t + ￿￿￿ ^ Gt ￿ ￿(￿ + 1) ^ At + ￿t
^ C￿










t = ￿^ ￿￿
t+1 + ￿
￿
(￿ + ￿) ^ C￿





Substitute the expression for ^ {￿
t: We obtain the following system:
￿1t = z10￿￿
t + z11￿1t￿1 + z12￿2t￿1
￿2t = z20￿￿
t + z21￿1t￿1 + z22￿2t￿1
￿ ^ dt = ^ dt￿1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿) ^ Ct + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ (2 ￿ ￿) ￿ 1) ^ St + ￿(1 ￿ ￿) ^ C￿
t
^ {t = ^ St+1 ￿ ^ St + ￿H;t+1 ￿ ￿dt ￿









+(fc1 ￿ n￿1z11 ￿ n￿2z21)￿1t￿1 + (fc2 ￿ n￿1z12 ￿ n￿2z22)￿2t￿1




^ {t ￿ ^ ￿H;t+1 ￿ ￿
￿
^ St+1 ￿ ^ St
￿￿
^ ￿Ht = ￿Et^ ￿Ht+1 + ￿
￿
(￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)) ^ Ct + ￿(1 + ￿￿ (2 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)) ^ St
￿
+￿￿￿(1 ￿ ￿) ^ C￿
t + ￿￿￿ ^ Gt ￿ ￿(￿ + 1) ^ At + ￿t
^ C￿










t = ￿^ ￿￿
t+1 + ￿
￿
(￿ + ￿) ^ C￿





We have four independent shocks ￿t;￿￿
t; ^ At; ^ A￿
t: We assume that they are independent AR(1)
processes.
C.4 Small Open Economy: System in Gaps
We assume that monetary policy use interest rate gap it = ^ {t ￿^ {n












34where ￿t = ^ ￿Ht ￿ ^ ￿n
Ht is in‡ation gap and yt = ^ Yt ￿ ^ Y n
t is output gap. The system of constraints
can be written as follows, and
^ ￿￿n











The evolution of the economy under control can be written as:
￿1t = z10￿￿
t + z11￿1t￿1 + z12￿2t￿1
￿2t = z20￿￿
t + z21￿1t￿1 + z22￿2t￿1
￿dt = dt￿1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)ct + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ (2 ￿ ￿) ￿ 1)st
+￿(1 ￿ ￿)nc0￿￿
t + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)nc1￿1t￿1 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)nc2￿2t￿1
it = st+1 ￿ st + ￿H;t+1 ￿ ￿dt +
￿




+(fc1 ￿ n￿1z11 ￿ n￿2z21)￿1t￿1 + (fc2 ￿ n￿1z12 ￿ n￿2z22)￿2t￿1
ct = ct+1 ￿
1
￿
(it ￿ ￿H;t+1 ￿ ￿(st+1 ￿ st))
￿Ht = ￿Et￿Ht+1 + ￿((￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿))ct + ￿(1 + ￿￿ (2 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿))st)
+￿￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)nc0￿￿
t + ￿￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)nc1￿1t￿1 + ￿￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)nc2￿2t￿1 + ￿t
and the goal variable
yt = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)ct ￿ ￿￿(￿ ￿ 2)(1 ￿ ￿)st + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)c￿
t
= (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)ct ￿ ￿￿(￿ ￿ 2)(1 ￿ ￿)st + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)nc0￿￿
t
+￿(1 ￿ ￿)nc1￿1t￿1 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)nc2￿2t￿1
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